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v. H. & St. J. Rd., 75 Id. 425; Morrisonv. Erie Ry., 56 N. Y.
302; Cr., H. & S. A. Rd. v. Smith, 59 Tex. 406; especially
where a passenger steps off a moving train contrary to the warning
of train employees: Jewell v. Rd., 54 Wis. 610. Nor will a passenger be justified in exposing himself to such peril upon the command, direction or advice of a conductor or other official on the
train, be it ever so plain and unambiguous. In such a case the passenger should, instead of complying, disobey such command or disregard such advice, for otherwise his rashness in exposing himself
to visible danger will defeat recovery in any case: Southwestern
By. v. Singleton, 66 Ga. 252; s. c.67 Id. 306; St. ,/. B. &
S. Rd. v. Cantrell, 37 Ark. 519 ; Rd. v. Krouse, 30 Ohio St. 222;
C. B. & Q. Rd. v. Hazzard, 26 fl1. 373; J. & . Rd. v. Hendricks, 26 Ind. 228.
WILLIAM COLEBROOKE.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
BENTLEY v. LAMB.
The duty to perform a positive promise which is not contrary to law or to public
policy, or obtained by fraud, imposition, undue influence, or mistake, is an obligation in morals, and being so, it is a sufficient consideration for an express promise.
A. gave to B., who had been employed by him for a number of years as
sales-lady, a due-bill for $3000, payable within one year after his death. This duebill was given in pursuance of an agreement wherein he agreed to give her the same,
and stated that it was for additional compensation for services rendered. A. died,
and his executors, on suit being brought on the due-bill, set up want of consideration. Hdd, that the services rendered, although partly paid for, were sufficient
consideration for the due-bill.

Common Pleas No. 1, Philadelphia county.
Assumpsit by Julia W. Lamb against Villiam K. Bentley and
Elizabeth Green, executors of John B. Green, deceased, upon a
due-bill for 83000, given by decedent to plaintiff. The action was
upon the following due-bill:
"Philadelphia, April 5th 1883.
"Due Miss Julia W. Lamb, three thousand dollars, additional
compensation as sales-lady in my store, No. 728 Spring Garden
street, payable one year after mydecease, by my executors or administrators to be paid out of my estate. If Miss Julia W. Lamb dies
before it becomes due, the money will revert back to the estate.
[Signed]
JOHN B. GREEN, 728 Spring Garden Street."
ERROR to
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This was given in pursuance of an agreement of like date, which
read thus:
"Philadelphia, April 5th 1883.
"Whereas, Miss Julia W. Lamb has been in my employ for about
twenty-three years as sales-lady, and having been faithful in the
discharge of her duty, and wishing to give her additional compensation for the services rendered, I hereby agree to give her a duebill of three thousand dollars, payable by my executors within oneyear from the time of my decease, to be paid out of my estate.
Jo.HN B. GREEN, 728 Spring Garden Street."
[Signed]
John B. Green died June 14th 1883, leaving a will dated June
1st 1883, which revoked all prior wills. The testator's daughter
swore that on the Tuesday following her father's decease she paid
the plaintiff "her week's wages, six dollars. I knew that six dollars was her week's wages, as I have frequently paid her before.
She did not claim anything more being due her. She said that it
was all right." The court instructed the jury to find a verdict for
the plaintiff. Verdict and judgment accordingly for plaintiff, whereupon defendants took this writ.
John

a. Johnson, for plaintiffs in error.

James S. Williams and Xt. Hampton Todd, for defendant in
error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GREEN, J.-We do not see how we can say as matter of law
that there was no evidence of a consideration for the obligation in
suit. There was no testimony as to what the actual agreement
of the parties was in regard to the compensation to be paid to the
plaintiff for her services. There was inferential evidence that it
was six dollars per week, because that amount was paid to and
accepted by her for one week's service after the testator's death.
But this is not necessarily inconsistent with a possible promise that
she should be paid a larger sum. It is, of course, consistent with
the theory that the sum thus paid was the stipulated compensation,
and therefore it would be evidence, though not conclusive, in an
action for the services. But here the action is upon an express
positive promise, in writing, signed by the decedent, to pay a fixed
sum. The only defence is want of consideration. What is the
state of the proof upon this subject ? A previous writing, also
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signed by the decedent, is in evidence, in which he recites that the
plaintiff had been in his employment for twenty-three years as
sales-lady; that she had been faithful in the discharge of her duty;
and that he wished to give her additional compensation for her services; and in consideration of 'these facts he agrees that he will
give her a due-bill for $3000, to be paid by his executors within one
year after his death. The decedent lived upwards of two months
after this paper was executed, and the plaintiff continued to render him service to the time of his death. The writing not only
recognises, but declares, that the due-bill shall be given as compensation for services rendered-additional compensation, it is true, but
compensation nevertheless. To what it was additional we do not
know. Whether it was additional to full or only partial compensation previously paid, is only a matter of conjecture. There is no
inference of law that the previous compensation was in full, and
the inference of fact would rather be that it was partial only, simply because the decedent himself so treats and declares it. Such a
declaration is certainly some evidence that there was an obligation
which the decedent regarded as binding upon him; and in consideration of his own sense of duty in the circumstances, no matter
how it arose, he contracted with the plaintiff that he would give
her a due-bill for the amount stated. In execution of this contract
he did give her the due-bill in question upon which this suit is
founded. If it be granted that the agreement to give the due-bill
imposed no legal obligation, how can it be denied that it created at
least a moral obligation to do so ? The duty to perform a positive
promise which is not contrary to law or to public policy, or obtained
by fraud, imposition, undue influence, or mistake, is certainly an
obligation in morals, and, if so, it is a sufficient consideration for
an express promise. But in the due-bill the recital of the consideration of actual services rendered is repeated, and it is some proof
that the services had been rendered, and had not been fully compensated. The decedent himself so admits and asserts, and it would
be an unjust assumption in the law to infer the contrary in the face
of such testimony. These features in the present case constitute a
wide difference between it and the cases cited for the plaintiff in
error, in which it was either proved or properly assumed that the
past consideratioi was entirely executed. Here there is, in the first
*place, a written agreement to give the due-bill, and the actual execution and delivery of the due-bill iin performance of that agree-
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ment.

There is, in addition, tle undisputed declaration of the

promise, that both the agreement and duc-hill were given as colnpensation for long and faithful services actually rendered by the

plaintiff, and no distinct proof thac those services had been fully
paid for. In such circumstances we cannot say there was no evidence of any obligation, legal or moral, to give the due-bill in question ; and, such being the case, there being nothing else to impeach
the right of recovery, the court below was right in directing a verdict for the plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.
We have read this case wih more than
usual interest, on account of the important questil involved, and because it
has seemed to us that the rule therein laid

down respecting the suflicjeicy of a mere
moral obligation to suplort an express
promise can hardly hc regardcd as the
rule of the common law. If there is any
one well-settled rule of the common law,
it is that a valuable consideration is necessary to support a simple contract ; and
we have alwavs understood a merely
moral obligation not to he a valuable
consideration.
With reference to this
qtestimo, Mr. Baron PARKE said : 1A
mere moral consideration is inothing:"
.Tenniugs v. Brown, 9 M. & W. 501. See
the cases collected in 1 Pars. (ont. *432
-4.
With reference to this subject Mr.
Parsons says : ,"The rule may now be
stated as follows: A moral obligation to
pay money or to perform a duty is a good
consideration for a promise to do so,
where there was originally an obligation
to pay the money or to do the duty, which
was enfbrceable at law hut for the interfereuce of sonie rule of law :" 1 Pars.
Cont. *434 ; note to Wennall v. Adney,
3 B. & P. 249.
It is true that the case of Lee v. Jfuggeridqe, 5 Taunt. 36, lays down the rule
that a moral obligation is a good consideraitun for a subsequent promise to pay,
and applies the doctrine to the promise
of a wonmn made after the death of her
husband to pay a bond made by her during coverture for the repayment by her

executors, of money advanced to her sonint-law, at her request, on the security of

said bond.

This case is supported by a

number of cases and dicta: Atkins v.
Banwedl, 2 East 506 ; Ilawkes v. Sunders, 1 Cowp. 294 ; Gibbs v. M1lerrill, 3
Taunt. : 1 ; Sanan v. Price. 2 Bing.
439 ; Bentley v. Aforse, 14 Johns. 468;
Glass v. Beach, 5 Vt: 176 ; Barlow v.
Snith, 4 Id. 144; Turner v. Patridlje,3
P. & W. 172 ; Conmnissioners v. Perry,
5 Ohio 58 ; Fairchild v. Bell, I lien
(S. C.) Dig. 60 ; Stewart v. Eden, 2
Caines 150; Wilson v. Burr, 25 Wend.
386. See, also, Goulding v. Davidson,
26 N. Y. 604.
The case of Lee v. Muggeridge, is,
however, believed to be opposed to the
weight of coni'mon-law authority.
Besides the authorities already cited, see
Littlefield v. Shee, 2 B. & Ad. 813:
Jllonkman v. Shepherdson, 11 A. & E.
415 ; Beaunmont v. Reeve, 8 Q. B. 486;
Eatirood v. Kenyan, I I A. & E. 447;
•&tj/
v. Dutton, 7 M. & G. 807 ; Cook
v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57; Mills v. It'gman,
3 Pick. 207; Edwards v. Daci., 16
Julohs. 283, note; Smith v. 11rare, 13
Id. 259 : MePherson v. Rees, 2 P. & W.
521 ; Freeman v. Robinsen, 9 Vroom 383;
Dodge v. Adais, 19 Pick. 429 ; Loomis
v. Nenhul, 15 Id. 159 ; Iarker v.Carter, 4 Munf. 273; Hawley v. Farrar, I
Vt. 420; Farnham v. O'Brien, 22 Me.
475 ; lVarren v. Whitney, 24 Id. 561 ;
Sneeely v. Read, 9 Watts 396 ; Ehle v.
Judson, 24 Wend. 97 ; Gcer v. Archer,
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2 Barb. 420; Shepard v. Rhodes, 7 R.I.
472; Bates v. Watson, 1 Sneed 376;
Arash v. Russell, 5 Barb. 556; Watkins
v. Halstead,2 Sandf. 311 ; Allen v.Bryson (S. Ct. Iowa), 25 N. W. Rep. 820 ;
Yelv. 41 b;-Metc. Contr. 178 ; I Chit.
Contr. (11th Am. ed.) 52; 2 Bl. Corn.
(Cooley's ed.) 445, note; 1 Pars. Cont.
*434.
Possibly upon the facts of the principal
case the court was warranted in saying
that it could not say as matter of law that
there was no evidence of a consideration.
But upon the other hand there was, as it
seems to us, evidence tending to show
that the due-bill was a mere gratuity,
and it seems to us that the question was
properly one of fact for the jury. The

equities of the ease were clearly -with the
plaintitY, and one cannot regret that the
decision was in her favor. But the court
have, as it seems to us, in laying down
the rule that the duty to perform a positive promisewhich is not contrary to law
or to public policy, or obtained by fraud,
imposition, undue influence or mistake,
is an obligation in morals, and, if so,
sufficient
consideration for an express
promise, gone farther than the English
or American authorities will support
them; or to state our opinion more clearly,
it seems to us that this doctrine can find
no valid support in the common law.
M. D. EwELL.
Chicago.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
WHITE v. COUNTY JUDGE.
Where a state constitution provides that every white male citizen, who shall have
resided in the state for a certain period preceding the election, shall have the right
to vote, any registry law which requires previous registry of the citizen as a prerequisite to the right to vote is unconstitutional and void.
Such a law is not a rule of procedure, but a legislative condition attempted to be
attached to the exercise of a constitutional right.

THIS suit was brought to determine the constitutionality of the
late act providing for the registration of voters. The constitution
of Oregon, art. 2, sect. 2, provides: "In all elections not otherwise provided for by this constitution, every white male citizen of
the Unfted States of the age of twenty-one years and upwards who
shall have resided in the state during the six months immediately
preceding such election, and every white male of foreign birth of the
age of twenty-one years and upwards who shall have resided in this
state during the six months immediately preceding such election,
and shall have declared his intention to become a citizen of the
United States one year preceding such election, conformably to the
laws of the United States on th'e subject of naturalization, shall be
entitled to vote at all elections authorized by law."
G. A. McBride, W. D. Fenton and John Burnett, for appellant.
,oseph Simon and John H. Gearin, contra.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
WALDO, 0. J.-The district-attorney for the fifth judicial district, as a sample of the workings of the law, explained how he
could be deprived of his vote by the mere fact of necessary absence
from Clackamas county during the period of registration in attending to his official duties in other counties in his district. We find
it unnecessary, however, to enter into an examination of the details
of the act, for it is met at the threshold by a fatal objection. As
we construe the constitution, every law which requires previous
registry as a prerequisite to the right to vote is, iso facto, void.
The legislature would have the power by imnplication, had it not
been expressly conferred, to prescribe the manner of regulating and
conducting the elections; but the right to vote itself has been
placed beyond their interference or control. This fact seems to have
been forgotten in framing the act. And how different, apparently,.
was the framers' conception of the important nature of the right
from that of Lord HOLT, nearly two hundred years ago, a, judge
who was never accused of being recreant to the liberties of Englishmen, "that a right which a man has to give his vote at the
election of a person to represent him in parliament, there to concur
to the making of laws, which are to him his liberty and property,
is a most transcendent thing and of a high nature:" Ashby v.
White, 2 Ld. Raym. 958. If the attention were not permitted to
wander beyond the act itself, the thought would hardly occur that
the legislature was dealing wiith a right vested in the citizen by
the constitution-a right of which "no department of the government, nor all of them combined," said the court in State v. Adams,
2 Stew. 239, "have the power to divest an individual otherwise
than is prescribed by the constitution." So in Brown v. Hummel,
6 Penn. St. 86, COULTER, J., said: "The most important of all
our franchises, the right of an elector and citizen, cannot, in a confined sense, be called property. It is not assets to pay debts, nor
does it descend to the heir or administrator. But who does not feel
its value, and who but would turn pale if he thought he could be
deprived of it, without hearing or trial, by Act of Assembly ?"
Important, however, as the question may be, we approach its consideration without solicitude, other than an anxiety to understand
and declare the law of the land. That inveterate argument, the
gravity of declaring an act of the legislature unconstitutional, was
urged as usual in such cases. If,however, a law be unconstitu-
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tional, the gravity of not declaring it to be so is also worthy of
consideration. Our constitutions are "written securities of liberty,"
as Chief Justice RuFF N has expressed it. That sound and able
judge, Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, of Michigan, well said, in Sears v.
Cottrell, 5 Mich. 283, that "every unconstitutional law which is
made to stand creates a permanent and deadly evil by overturning
the only safeguards we have against public usurpation." The judiciary, as the guardians of the people's constitutional liberties, must
in duty observe that vigilance against constitutional encroachment,
which is said to be the price of liberty. The rules of law are bevond the control of those who are merely to declare what the law is.
In every case, the gravity consists in ascertaining what the law
is. A text of the famous Littleton has come down to us in the year
books (Year Book, 6th ed. 4, 8, pl. 18): Le ley est tout*un en greind
et meind-the law is all one in great things and small. The right
to vote, under the Constitution, is a vested and constitutional right.
"When I say a right is vested, I mean that he has the power to do
certain actions, or to possess certain things, according to the law of
the land." CHASE, J., in CalTer v. Bull, 8 Dall. 394. If the right
be vested by the constitution, it denotes a right that cannot, under
the constitu'ion, be taken away : Bich v. landers, 89 N. H. 885 ;
Eakin v. Baub, 12 S. & R. 860. It would seem that every case,
from 6apen v. .Foster, 12 Pick. 485, down, which has sustained
against similar objections the constitutionality of a registry law
which requires previous registry as a prerequisite to the right to
vote, has taken it for granted that such laws were mere rules of procedure. It was assumed in Capen v. Foster, 8upra, that the right
to make investigations into the qualifications of voters necessarily
implies the right to compel the voter to furnish previous proof of
his qualifications ; that such a law was but " a reasonable and convenient regulation of the mode of exercising the right of voting." It
was placed on the same footing with a law which required the voter
to offer his vote in writing. Now, voting viva voce, or by ballot, is
a pure rule of procedure. So are laws regulating polling places,
and the time for opening and closing the polls. He who takes
a check to a bank to cash it must endorse it. He who pays
money is entitled to a receipt. This is procedure. But if a contract be to pay money on a fixed day, a subsequent law requiring
the payee to give ten days' hotice of the time and place of payment, or no obligation to pay shall arise, affects the substance of
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the contract, and is void. It is conceived that laws are of like
nature which require previous registry in order to vote. Where
the right is secured by the constitution, such laws, having merely a
legislative sanction, are void. The true view of this question seems
to be that stated in State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 86, that where registry
is required as a prerequisite to the right to vote, such registry is a
condition precedent to the right itself, and therefore a rule of substantive law. This principle was subsequently practically applied
in Dells v. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 555, in which a registry law of Wisconsin was held to be void. It results as follows: A right has been
defined by Mr. Justice HOLMES to be the legal consequence which
attaches to certain facts: The Common Law 214. Every fact which
forms one of the group of facts, of which the right is the legal consequence, appertains to the substance of the right.
The right to vote under the constitution may be defined to be a
vested right in prcesenti, to be exercised in futuro on a fixed day.
When that day arrives and the right is to be exercised, every fact
essential to the existence of the right is a substantive- fact. Previous registry in order to vote is precisely such a fact. It is a condition precedent which must be performed, or when the day arrives
no right will exist. Procedure ex vi termini appertains to the mode
of enjoyment or enforcement of a right. No rule of procedure can
operate anterior to the time when the right is to be enjoyed or
enforced. It cannot have effect to determine a right before the right
accrues. The distinction, therefore, sought to be drawn on this
subject between what constitutes a qualification and what in contradistinction is called a mode of proof of qualification, is unsubstantial. We may say of the attempted distinction in words of a chief
justice in England centuries ago: "Therefore, we must take off
this veil and cover of words which make a show of something and
in truth are nothing." "Every definition of the qualification of
voters," said Mr. Drake, the author of the Law of Attachment,
arguing in Blair v. Bidgely, 41 Mo. 163, "is but a statement of
the terms on which men may vote; and in every instance, such definitions refer to what a party has done as well as to what he is.
They say to the voter : ' If you have done certain things you can
vote.' " He who does not register is not qualified to vote, and hence
is not a qualified elector-a phrase that is used five times in the
constitution to signify those who are entitled to go to the polls on
election day and legally vote. See Byrne v. State, 12 Wis. 524;
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Sanford v. Prentice, 28 Id. 363. But under this act, he who goes
to the polls on election day, possessing every constitutional qualification, may find that the legislature has stepped in between him
and the constitution. He finds his vote denied because he has not
done something which the legislature has required him to do. He
discovers that he is not a qualified elector, and yet he is told that.
his omission to do the act which had effect to disqualify him is not
itself a disqualification. Or'if he had performed the act, that his
performance does not constitute a qualification. This will not square
with the logic of facts. The distinction is between what is substantive
and what is modal. He who has a right to do something to-morrow
can never be secure of his right before to-morrow comes. If this
can result, then the constitution does not mean what it says. McCaffarty v. Guyer, 59 Penn. St. 111, very aptly says: " Can the
legislature then take away from an elector his right to vote while
he possesses all the qualifications required by the constitution .
This is the question now before us. When the citizen goes to the
polls on election day with the constitution in his hand and presents
it as giving him a right to vote, can he be told, ' true, you have every
qualification that instrument requires ; it declares you entitled to
the right of an elector, but an Act of Assembly forbids your vote,
and therefore it cannot be received.' If so, the legislature is superior to the organic law of the state; and the legislature, instead of
being controlled by it, may mould the constitution at their pleasure.
Such is not the law." And so must we say in this case. Where
a constitution provides, as does that of New York, " that laws shall
be made for ascertaining by proper proofs the citizens who shall be
entitled to the right of suffrage," the power to pass a registry law
seems fully implied. See U. S; v. Quinn, 8 Blatchf. 59. The case
of State v. Butts, 31 Kans. 554, was grounded on a like constitutional clause. The difference between those cases and the present
is the difference between a case .where a power has been conferred
and a case where it has not. So, on the other hand, a question can
never arise under a constitution like that of Texas, which has declared in unequivocal terms, that "no law shall ever be enacted
requiring a registration of the voters of this state." See U. S. v.
Slater, 4 Woods 358. The right of the plaintiff to maintain this
suit is set at rest by the decision of this court in Carman v.
Woodruff, 10 Oregon 133. The opinion cites, with many other
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cases, Page v. Allen, 58 Penn. St. 338, which presented this very
case.
Injunction granted.
THAYER,

J., dissented.

" In all cases where the constitution has
conferred a political right or privilege,
and where the constitution has not particularly designated the manner in which
that right is to be exercised, it is clearly
within the just and constitutional limits
of the legislative power to adopt any reasonable and uniform regulations in regard
to tile
time and mode of exercising that
right, which are designed to secure and
facilitate the exercise of such right in a
prompt and convenient manner. Such
a construction would afford no warrant
for such an exercise of legislative power,
as under the pretence and color of regulating should subvert or injuriously restrain the right itself. * * *

"The constitution, by carefully prescribing the qualifications of voters,
necessarily requires that an examination
of the claim of persons to vote on the
ground of possessing these qualifications
must at some time be had by those who
are to decide on them. * * *

" If then the constitution has made no
provision in regard to the time, place
and manner in which such examination
shall be had, and yet such examination
is necessarily incident to the actual enjoyment and exercise of the right of voting, it constitutes one of those subjects,
respecting the mode of exercising the
right, in relation to which it is competent
to the legislature to make suitable and
reasonable regulation not calculated to
defeat or impair the right of voting, but
rather to facilitate and secure the exercise of that right:" SHAw, C. J., in
Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485 ; s. c. 23
Am. Dec. 632; State v. Lean, 9 Wis.
279.
The necessity for some provision to
ascertain who are qualified voters, and
the propriety of a registry law of some
naturefor this purpose, seem to have been
VOL. XXXIV.-81

recognised in all the reptrted cases, unless the principal case is to be regarded
as an exception.
"The object of all registry laws,"
says TAvoR, J., "is to ascertain, before
the election day, who are the qualified
electors in each election district, and to
do away with the necessity, as far as possible, of investigating as to the qualifications of electors on the day of election,
and to prevent fraudulent voting by giving publicity beforehand to the names
of all persons who claim the right to vote
at the coming election. * * *

"Experience has demonstrated that
registry laws are necessary to insure a
fair and honest vote in all large cities,
and such laws have been enacted and
enforced in such cities in very many of
the states of the Union for many years.
In order to preserve even a pretence of
purity in elections in the large centres of
population, it is necessary that evidence
of this right of the electors to vote should
be produced before the day of election
in order to enable the real electors to
vote on that day; and it would be highly
inconvenient, if not impossible, to make
the necessary investigations on that day.
Registration is in fact nothing more than
a metod of taking evidence beforehand
of the right of the elector to vote on the
day of election :" Dells v. Kennedy, 49
Wis. 555 ; a. c. 35 Am. Rep. 786 ; People v. Hoffinan, 5 'N. E. Rep. 596.
It is generally conceded that a registry law which attempts to add to the
prescribed constitutional qualifications
for electors, by increasing the required
time of residence or limiting the prescribed district wherein the elector may
vote, or providing for payment of a special tax as a prerequisite, or which makes
race or class distinctions, is unconstitutional and void: Page v. Allen, 58 IPenn.
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St. 338 ; State v. Wiliams, 5 Wis. 308 ;
Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665; U.
S. v. Slater, 4 Woods 358; but see
Davis v. School District, 44 N. H. 398.
About the constitutionality of registry
laws which require the elector who has
not registered before the day of election
to make oath to his qualifications, of the
reasons for his failure to register and to
supplement such evidence by that of duly
registered election, there can be no reasonable doubt: State v. Hlilmantel, 21
Wis. 566; Edmonds v. Banbury, 28 Ia.
267; s. o. 4 Am. Rep. 177; State v.
Baker, 38 Wis. 71 ; In re Election o1
McDonough, 105 Penn. St. 490; Hyde
v. Brush, 34 Conn. 454.
"There can be no question that the
legislature may provide all reasonable
safeguards to preserve the ballot box
from fraud, and to maintain the purity
of our elections, and as the wisdom of
our laws, the fair and impartial administration of justice, depend upon the officers chosen by the people and even the
perpetuity of our present form of government can only be maintained by preserving our elections free from fraud and
*corruption, all reasonable requirements,
for the purpose not calculated to, abridge
the elective franchise, are within the scope
of legislative power. That the affidavit
of the elector and the oath of the householder is a reasonable requirement would
seem to be clear in all cases when the
elector's name does not appear upon the
registry. It in nowise abridges his right
to vote if entitled to the privilege :"
Byler v. Asher, 47 Ill. 101.
Whether a law is valid which makes
registration before the day of election
absolutely necessary to vote, and provides no way for the elector to prove his
qualifications at the polls, is a much
vexed question. The courts of Wisconsin, Ohio and Oregon, supra, have de
clared such laws void. .
In Daggett v. Hudson, 3 N. E. Rep.
(Ohio) 538, it is said: "The necessary
absence of a voter on the seven days pro-

vided by statute for registration, either
by sickness, business, imprisonment or
other lawful reason, absolutely forfeits
for the time being his constitutional right
of suffrage. He cannot anticipate expected absence and register at an earlier
period. He cannot prove his right by
the affidavit of others, and excuse his
personal appearance at the place of registration. He cannot, on the day of
election or within five days prior thereto,
by any proof of constitutional qualification, supply the want of former registration. A foreigner who has taken out his
first papers and made his necessary declaration to become a citizen, and whose
right to full citizenship and the elective
franchise will ripen during the five days
before or on the day of election, cannot
secure registration or the right to vote because he cannot prove in advance that the
iction of the court will naturalize him."
In Dells v. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 555, the
court use much the same argument and
add: "That vice is that the law disfranchises a constitutionally qualified
elector without his default or negligence,
and makes no exception in his favor,
and provides no method, chance or opportunity for him to make proof of his
qualificattons on the day of election, the
only time perhaps when he could possibly
do so."
On the other hand the courts of New
York, Massachusetts, Illinois, Michigan
and Kansas, have decided in favor of
the constitutionality of laws requiring
previous registration as an absolute prerequisite to voting.
In People v. Hofnman, 5 N. E. Rep.
596 (II1.), the court says : "What evidence shall be required to establish a
voter's qualifications and how that evidence shall be presented to a body acting
upon it as a matter of discretion with
the legislature. * * * If cases can be
supposed where the three weeks' requirement will deprive qualified electors of
the privilege of depositing their votes,
cases can also be supposed where one
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186; Ensworth v. Albin, 46 Mo. 450 ;
day's requirement will work the same
result. This mode of reasoning, carried Keenan v. Cook, 12 R. I. 52; People v.
out to its logical sequence, will make any Laine, 33 Cal. 55 ; Webster v. Byrnes,
34 Id. 273 ; C. N., N. G. Rd. v. Comkind of registry law unconstitutional;
for it would be a physical impossibility missioners, 72 N. C. 486 ; Cooley Const.
for the judges of the election to receive Lir. 757 ; McCrary on Elections 47.
We cannot but regard the latter docthe votes and make up the register at the
same time and on the same day. If the trine as supported by the great weight
legislature has the power to direct the of authority, and a system of registration
registry to be completed before election requiring proof of the elector's qualificaday, and if in its wisdom and under a tions before election day, as a reasonable
sense of its responsibility to the people, regulation, since in many cities it is a neit has said that three weeks before elec- cessity if the spirit of a constitution
tion is a reasonable date for the comple- designed to protect free and equal election of the registry, shall this court sub- tions, is to be observed.
A registry law is not unconstitutional,
stitute its judgment for that of the lawmaking power, and say a shorter time which may operate to require greater
would have been more reasonable? proofs of the elector's qualifications in
* * * If closing the registry lists three one locality than in another: Patterson
weeks before election may deprive a few v. Barlow, 60 Penn. St. 54 ; State v.
persons becoming qualified during that Butts, 31 Kans. 537 ; Peoplev.-Hoffinan,
period of the privilege of casting their 5 N. E. Rep. 596.
For discussion of registry laws, touchballots, keeping it open to a later day,
may admit to the polls hundreds of per- ing upon the political opinions of election
sons who should never have been allowed officers, see People v. Hoffman, supra;
Atty-Gen. v. Detroit, 24 N. W. Rep.
to vote."
So in State v. Butts, 31 Kans. 537, 887.
Where a registry law requires regisBnEWEt, J., said: "It is true isolated
instances may occur where a party through tration as a prerequisite to voting, a
absence or sickness is unable to register failure to make such registry will make
and so loses his vote, but the same result the election void : Perry v. Whitaker, 71
may follow where any failure to produce N. C. 475; People v. Kopplekom, 16
the required evidence occurs. It is a Mich. 342 ; Zeiler v. Chapman, 54 Mo.
mistake to suppose that there is any spe- 502; Nefzger v. D. 4- St. P. Rd., 36
cial virtue in the mere day of election. Ia. 642 ; State v. Stumpf, 23 Wis. 630;
If the legislature has the right to require People v. Laine, 33 Cal. 55. But mere
proof of a man's qualification, it has a irregularities in the registry will not inright to say when such proof shall be fur- validate the election: Atty.- Gen. v. Ely,
nished and before what tribunal; and 4 Wis. 420; State v. .Elwood, 12 Id.
unless this power is abused the courts 551 ; State v. Baker, 38 Id. 71 ; Barnes
may not interfere." It may be remarked v. Supervisors, 51 Miss. 305 ; NVewsom
that the constitutional provisions referred v. Earnhart, 86 N. C. 391 ; People v.
Wilson, 62 N. Y. 186 ; Brightly Lead.
to in the principal case gives no authority
to the legislatures of New York and Elect. Cas. 448 n.
As to the legality of a vote cast by a
Kansas to add to the qualifications of
electors, but simply to determine who are qualified but unregistered voter, see Dale
qualified, a power necessarily implied v. Irwin, 78 Ill. 170 ; Clark v. Robinson,
where not expressed: U. S. v. Quinn, 8 88 Id. 498; Kuykendall v. Harker, 89
Blntchf. 48. See, also, Capen v. Foster, Id. 126 ; State v. Hilmantel, 21 Wis.
CiARL s A. RoBBINS.
12 lick. 485 ; People v. Kopplekom, 16 566.
Mich. 342 ; People v. Wilson, 62 N. Y.
I Lincoln, Neb.
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NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. v. SHIMMEL.
Where an office safe, kept at a railroad depot and used by the agent as a place
of deposit for his daily receipts and valuable papers, is useful, and facilitates the
successful operation of the road, it is not subject to levy under an execution on a
judgment against the road.
APPEAL from First District, Custer county.

Saunders, Cullen
Railroad Company.

. Saunders, for appellant, Northern Pacific

WADE, C. J.-The only questions presented by this appeal are
the following, viz. : 1. Does the evidence support the verdict and
justify it? 2. Can the property of the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, in the territory of Montana, necessary, convenient and
usual for running and operating said road, be lawfully seized and
sold on execution to satisfy a judgment against said company ? The
property in question is a certain office safe, known as a "Diebold
Combination Safe," which was seized on an execution issued out
of the Probate Court of Yellowstone county, and taken from the
plaintiff's depot and station at the town of Billings, in said county,
and sold at auction, whereby the defendant claims title and right
of possession. There was a verdict and judgment for defendant,
and the plaintiff appeals.
As to the question whether the safe in controversy was a part of
the usual, necessary and convenient equipment of the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, to enable it to operate its road at the time
it was seized on execution, the testimony showed that the safe was in
use by the plaintiff in and about its business as a railroad company
in the depot at Billings, and was the only safe there; that it was in
daily use by the company in its railroad business thereat, in keeping
therein the moneys received by the company, which amounted to
from two hundred to five thousand dollars per day, and in the preservation of its books of account of said railroad business at said station ; that since the safe had been taken away, the agent at Billings,
in consequence of its seizure, had been compelled to use safes of
other parties by their consent, or else carry said moneys on his person; and in the opinion of said agent, said safe was, under the circumstances, a necessary part of the equipment and furniture of the
plaintiff at said depot. It also appeared in evidence that there was
a bank in said town, with a vault, wherein plaintiff was permitted
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to deposit its moneys, books and papers, and that the plaintiff had
procured no other safe since the one in question was seized. The
foregoing was all the testimony at the trial concerning the questions
proposed.
Upon this state of facts, the court instructed the jury as follows:
"If it has been proven to your satisfaction, by a preponderance of
evidence, that this safe was an office safe-was in use at the depot
at this station ; that it was a usual and necessary part of the
furniture in such office, in the preservation and safe-keeping of the
moneys, books of account and valuable papers used in the transaction of the business of the plaintiff at such depot, and essential
to the proper and safe conduct of such business there-then you
should find for the plaintiff.
"In this case the question arises whether the property can be
seized under execution for the payment of the debts of the company, inasmuch as it is held to be essential to the ordinary and
economical use of the railroad company. There are certain classes
of property belonging to railroad companies not subject to seizure
and sale upon execution, such as their tracks, rolling stock, depots,
shops and machinery, the use of which is essential to the operation
of the road; the reason for this being that such seizure and sale
would result in the destruction of the property. There are certain
other classes of property which may be seized and sold upon execution against a railroad company, such as lands and personal property not used in the running and operating of the road. Such
property is always subject to execution, and it is the duty of the
sheriff to search for this kind of property upon which to levy. An
office safe is a necessary part of the furniture in a town where the
business is important and extensive, and where the receipts of the
railroad company are of so large an amount, and the books required
to keep the accounts of the office contain valuable memoranda, as
that it would be proper and prudent to preserve them from depredation or destruction by the use of a safe.
"And in this case, if you find from the evidence the business
here so extensive, the receipts so valuable, as that a prudent man
would require the use of a safe, then you should find for the
plaintiff."
These instructions correctly stated the law, and were applicable
to the facts in the case.
Rorer, in his work on Railroads (vol. 2, p. 901), says: "' The
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corporate franchise, rights and property of a railroad corporation,
incidental thereto, cannot at common law be seized or sold upon
execution at law against the company ; nor can the appurtenances,
easements, appliances, or works used for the practical operation
of the road be levied upon or sold at law upon execution separate
from franchise, any more, or more legally, than the whole can be
sold together. Such sale would impair its value and impede its use
by the public;" citing the following authorities: Crue v. Tidewater
Canal Co., 24 How. 263; Rorer Jud. Sales, sect. 1068; Coe v.
Colum6us, P. & . Bd., 10 Ohio St. 372; Western Pa. Bd. v.
Johnston, 59 Penn. St. 290; Youngman v. Elmira & T. Rd., 65
Id. 278; Bayard'sAppeal, 72 Id. 453; Thomas v. Armstrong, 7
Cal. 286; Stewart v. Jones, 40 Mo. 140; Hatcher v. Toledo, W.
TV. Bd., 62 Ill. 477; James v. Pontiac & C. Rd., 8 Mich. 91;
Ammant v. New Alexandria & P. T. Co., 13 S. & R. 212; Plymouth Rd. v. Colwell, 39 Penn. St. 337; Rorer Jud. Sales, sect.
1069.
In Gue v. Tidewater Canal Co.; TANiY, C. J., says: "It would
be against the principles of equity to allow a single creditor to
destroy a fund to which other creditors had a right to look for payment, and equally against'the principles of equity to permit him to
destroy the value of the property of the stockholders, by dissevering from the franchise property which was essential to its useful
existence."
In Herman on Executions 551, it is said, the rule and common
law is that the franchises and corporate rights of a corporation, and
the means invested in them which are necessary to the existence
and maintenance of the object for which they are created, are incapable of being transferred and granted away by any adverse process
against them.
The plaintiff has the right to operate its road through the territory of Montana, and to have all the works and appliances essential
to its useful existence as a railroad. This franchise was given by
act of Congress, and the road made a military and post road for
the benefit of the government of the United States, and whatever is
useful in operating the road belongs to and goes with the franchise;
and no law of the territory or any other jurisdiction, less than that
which created it, can in any manner rightfully invade or impair the
privileges and immunities thus conferred. If an office safe at a
depot in which the agent deposits and keeps his daily receipts and
.
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valuable papers is useful and facilitates the successful operation of
the road, it could no more be seized on execution than could a section of the rails, or road-bed, or water-tank. These things are
incidental to the franchise and cannot be disturbed. They are the
means by which the franchise is exercised. They are the necessary
instruments of its use.
The charter of the plaintiff authorizes and empowers it to lay
out, locate, construct, furnish, maintain and enjoy a continuous railroad line, with the appurtenances, from Lake Superior to Puget
Sound, and if an office safe at any depot on said road is useful and
convenient to the plaintiff in the enjoyment of said franchise, then
the same is protected from seizure on execution. This franchise,
or right to maintain and enjoy the road, is not limited and restricted
to what is barely necessary for that purpose, but extends to what is
appropriate and useful, and actually in use. Railroad companies
can be made to pay their debts, but the remedy is not by seizing
and selling property that would destroy the road, and thereby prevent its earning money for its creditors.
The testimony shows, without question or contradiction, that this
safe was an office safe, used by plaintiff in its depot at Billings station, in the regular daily business of the road, and that the same
was a necessary part of the equipment and furniture of said depot
for the purposes of such business. The court instructed the jury
that if it had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
the safe in question was an office safe, used in the depot at Billings, and that it was a usual and necessary part of the furniture
in such office for the safe-keeping of moneys, books of account, and
valuable papers used in the transaction of plaintiff's business, and
essential to the proper and safe conduct of such business, then that
they should find for the plaintiff. The jury, by the verdict for the
defendant, must have found from the evidence that the safe was
subject to sale, on execution, for the reason that the same was not
a usual and necessary part of the equipment and furniture of said
depot, and essential and proper to the safe conduct of the business
of the road. There is no evidence to support such a finding or verdict. The verdict is a direct contradiction of all the evidence in
the case.
The agent of the plaintiff testified that the safe, considering the
business at the Billings depot, was a necessary part of the equipment and furniture of the depot for the purposes of such business,
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and there was no evidence to contradict the agent, or to call in
question his statement as to the necessities of plaintiff's business at
that point. But the jury, in answer to a special issue submitted,
say that the safe in controversy was not necessary in carrying on
the business of the company. In this they contradict the only witness on the subject, and make a special finding, in the very face of
all the testimony on the question submitted.
Appellate courts are slow to disturb the verdict of a jury, and
will not do so if there is evidence to support the verdict (Ming v.
Truett, 1 Mont. 828); but if the verdict is a flat contradiction of
all the evidence in the case, and there is nothing to support it, it
would be a reproach to the law, and to those who administer it, to
permit such a verdict to stand.
Judgment is reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.
GExERAL Ru n.-The general rule
at common law is that the franchises and
corporate rights of a corporation are
incapable of being transferred and
granted away by any adverse process
against it: Herman on Executions 551.
Applying this rule to-railways, it is said
that the lands, easements or works appurtenant or essential to the practical
use and operation of the franchise of the
railway company cannot be sold separate
from the franchise so as to impair its
value or impede itsuse. One reason
for the existence of this rule is that
the public have an interest in the operation of the road which ought not to
be destroyed or impaired in any controversy between the railroad company,
which is the servant of the public in
operating the road, and its creditors.

ration. The only remedy which the law
allows to creditors against property so
held is sequestration (9 W. & S. 28), and
that remedy is consistent with corporate
existence; whilst a power to alien or
liability to levy and sale on execution
would hang the existence of the corporation on the caprices of the managers,
or on the mercy of its creditors, for, the
corporation would cease to exist for the
purposes of its institution where its means
of subsistence were gone. It might still
have a name to live, but it would be
only a life in name.- A railroad company could scarcely accomplish the end
of its being after the ground on which
its rails rest had been sold to a stranger:" Plymouth Rd. v. Colwell, 39 Penn.
St. 339. And in support of the general
rule may be cited the following cases :
Youngman v. Rd., 65 Penn. St. 286 ;
J.,
As remarked by WooDwkBD,
""though a (railway) corporation in re- Pomouth Bd. v. Colwell, 39 Id. 337 ;
spect to its capital is private, yet itwas Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Bonham, 9 W.
created to accomplish objects in which & S. 27 ; Ammant v. Turnpike Co., 13
the public had a direct interest, and its S. & R. 210; Coe v. Rd., 10 Ohio St.
authority to hold lands was conferred 372; Gue v. Tide Water Canal Co., 24
that these objects might be worked out. How. 263.
Such being the rule and its reason,
They shall not be balked, therefore,
either by the act of the company itself or about which there is no especial conflict
of its creditors. For the sake of the pub- of authority, the inquiry is, what prolic, whatever is essential to the corporate perty is so essential to the operation of
functions shall be retained by the corpo- a railway and its lines as to he beyond the
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reach of execution, and what property
is not essential to the operation of a
railway and may, theretore, be levied on
under such process ?

PROPERTY NOT EXEMPT FRO31 EXECUTION AS BEING ESSENTIAL TO THE EXERCISE O RAILWAY FIANCHISES.-&
canal basin is not a legitimate incident
to a railway, having no authorized canal
PROPERTY EXE31PT PROm EXECUTION connection, and is not protected from
AS BEING ESSENTIAL TO THE EXERCISE levy and sale on execution against the
or RAILWAY FnANcHiSES.-Tolls on a
company: Plymouth Rd. v. Colwell, 39
canal are essential to a franchise. So Penn. St. 337 ; and with reference to
also are locks on a canal, the toll house railroad lands, this general rule may be
or collector's office and the land sur- affirmed: Lands owned by a railroad
rounding the outlet locks: Gue v. Tide company beyond what are actually dediWwter Canal Co., 24 How. 257. See, cated to corporate purposes, are bound
also, Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Bonham, by the lienofjudgments against thecom9 W. & S. 27.
pany and are liable to be levied in exeA turnpike road is essential to the cution and sold by the sheriff as are the
franchise of a turnpike company: Am- lands of any other debtor. But the purmant v. Turnpike Co., supra.
chaser at such sale takes only that which
Tolls received on a railroad after judg- is not necessary for the full enjoyment
ment is rendered against the company and exercise of the corporate franchise,
and the appointment of a sequestrator no matter how acquired by the corporaare not bound by such judgment so as tion. See Plymouth Rd. v. Colwell, 39
to give it a preference of payment out Penn. St. 337 ; Youngman v. Elmira,
of them : Leedom v. Plymouth Bd., 5 W. &-c., Bd., 65 Id. 278.
& S. 265. In Seymnourv. Milford 6- C.
Land of a foreign railroad corporation
Turnpike Co., 10 Ohio 476, it was held not chartered in a state is regarded as
that an execution cannot be levied upon simple realty when levied on, but no
the right of a company to take tolls un- order will be made affecting the interest
less notice has first been given according
of a domestic corporation not a party:
to the provisions of the Ohio statute to Chapnan v. Pittsburgh, J'.c, Bd., 18
some receiver of the toll on the road.
West Va. 184 ; 9 Am. & Eng. Ed. Cas.
Money payable by railroad for injur- 484.
ies to homestead is exempt from execuWhen judgment is obtained by a pastion: Kaiser v. Seabon, 62 Iowa 463, 14 senger against a railroad company for
Am. & Eng. Rd. Cas. 405. The rail- personal injuries, and execution is levied
way plant of a dock company authorized upon an engine, the execution will not be
to construct a railroad is exempt from enjoined on application of creditors of a
execution under the English Railway partnership of which tho railroad comCompanies' Act, though the railway is pany was a, member, when the equities
merely ancillary to the main object of the are equal, and it does not appear that
company: Great Northern Rd. v. Ta- partnership indebtedness existed when
hourdin, L. R., 13 Q. 13.Div. 320; 20 the property was taken in execution:
Am. & Eg. Rd. Cas. 562.
Lamoilla Rd.v. Bixby, 55 Vt. 235; 16
The purchaser of a right of way under Am. & Eng. Rd. Cas. 474.
execution takes no title if he does not
own the franchises of the company and
ROLLING STocK.-There is a conflict
the transferree of franchises may recover of authority upon the point whether rollagainst him in ejectment: Eastern A Ia. ing stock is subject to execution or not.
As pointed out by Mr. Wood, 3 Wood's
Rd. v.Visscher, 114 U. S. 340; 20 Am.
Ry. Law 1624, 1625, in several states
& Eng. Rd. Cas. 566.
VOL. XXXIV.-82
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rolling stock essential to the operation
of the road, as cars, engines, &c., is held
to be affixed thereto, so as to pass under
a mortgage of the railroad, and not to
be subject to levy or sale upon execution : Gue v. Tide Water Co., 24 How.
(U. S.) 257 ; Youngman v. Elmira, 6-c.,
Rd., 65 Penn. St. 278 ; ShamokinValle/
Rd. v. Livermore, 47 Id. 465; Cbneyv.
Pittsburgh, 4-c., Rd., 3 Phila. (Penn.)
173; Macon, 6-c., Rd. v. Parker,9 Ga.
377; Phillips v. Winslow, 18 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 431. But in New York (Randall
v. Elwell, 52 N. Y. 521 ; Hoyle v. Plattsburgh, d-c., R., 54 Id. 314; Stevens v.

Buffalo, 4-c., Rd., 31 Barb. 590), New
Jersey (Williamson v. N. . Southern
Rd., 29 X. J. Eq. 311), New Hampshire,
(Boston, 6-c., Rd. v. Gilmore, 37 N. H.
410), and Ohio (Coe v. Columbus, 4-c.,
Rd., 10 Ohio St. 372), it is treated as
personal property, and, as such, subject
to levy and sale upon execution unless it
has passed into the possession of the
mortgagees. In some of the states the
constitution expressly provides that it
shall be regarded as personal property,
as in Arkansas, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Texas and West Virginia.
ADELB]RT RA- LTO1!.

suTpreme Ctourt of Missouri.
DAVIS v. WABASH, ST. LOUIS & PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.
In an: action against a common carrier for the loss of goods, where the defence is
that the loss was occasioned by the "act of God,"-as in this case an extraordinary
flood-the burden of showing that the negligence of the carrier contributed or cooperated with the act of God to produce the loss, is on the shipper.
The defence of the act of God may be shown under a general denial.
APPEAL

from St. Louis Court of Appeals.

.Noble J Orrick, for plaintiffs.
. S. Priest,for defendant.
The facts are stated in the opinion, which was delivered by
RAY, J.-This action was begun by plaintiff, to recover damages
sustained by his goods, consisting of silks and other valuable dry
goods whilst in defendant's possession, as a common carrier. Upon
a trial in the circuit court, plaintiffs had a verdict and judgment in
their favor for $6184,29, from which defendant appealed to the St.
Louis Court of Appeals, where the same was affirmed, and defendant has appealed therefrom to this court.
The goods, when damaged, were in course of transportation from
New York to East St. Louis, by "The South Shore Line" which,
it appears, did a "transportation business" over several connected
railroads, including that of the defendant.
The merchandise arrived at Toledo on the 11th day of February
1881, and the car, being in a crippled condition, was sent to the
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transfer house, where the goods were unloaded and placed on the
pl-ftform at 2.30 o'clock P. m. of said, day, at which time the dafendant gave its receipt for the goods, to-the connecting road. This
transfer house, it seems, is a place where freight going-in both direc.
tions, east, and west, is exchanged by numerous railroads connecting
at Toledo, and, as also appears, freight thus passing- through said
exchange depot is, in the usual and ordinary course of business,
subject to some necessary and unavoidable delay, occasioned by the
switching, unloading and transfer of the same- from one railroad ta
another. By 8 o'clock P.m.' of said February 11th 1881, the defendant had reloaded the goods from the platform of the transfer
house into one of its cars, preparatory to shipment of the same- to
East St. Louis, which car containing plaintiff's goods was left,
with other cars, standing at the platform waiting to be attached to
defendant's train to St. Louis, which, it seems; would, in the-ordinary course of business, leave- Toledo about la or i1 o'clock that
night, or'would be switched, with- others, in the usual course of business, out of the transfer house at or before 11 o'clock, at which
hour the men usually quit work 'for the night.
The evidence indicates-pretty clearly, we think, that in handling
and taking the freight in its turnr (which was the duty of the carrier in the premises, in the absence of perishable qualities in theproperty, or other special circumstances giving-it preference), the
car in question could not have beea gotten out, in the usual course
of business, in time for the earlier train for St. Louis that night-.
The testimony-of Rich and Stowe, who were sworn in plaintiffs'
behalf, is, we think, substantially to this effect: About midnight on
said February 11th, the waters from a flood in the Maumee river
reached the railroad tracks at the transfer house, and soon rose high
enough to submerge and damage plaintiff's dry goods whilst in said
car at the platform, awaiting shipment. The evidence offered in
plaintiffs' behalf, as well as that for defendant, show that the waters
in which said goods were submerged, as charged in the petition,
were the waters of an extraordinary flood, occurring in the Maumee
river.
The character and magnitude of this flood is not called into question, but, on the contrary, it is conceded to have been unprecedented,
and such as is denominated an "act of God," properly so called.
There is further evidence also offered by plaintiff, tending, at least
in some degree, to support the allegation in the petition that defend-
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ant negligently permitted the goods to be submerged. The evidence
for plaintiff in this behalf is not, perhaps, harmonious; indeed, it
is, we think, conflicting and contradictory; but it is sufficient, we
think, to meet the objection urged upon us with great earnestness,
that there is no substantial evidence of negligence to go to the jury.
A summary of this evidence prepared by the Court of Appeals,
with special reference to this'objection, will be found in the opinion
of that court: 13 Mo. App. Rep. 449-454.
The evidence we deem of most importance, and upon which, as
the same is now preserved in the r ecord, the liability of defendant,
if any, mainly depends, we think,is that tending somewhat to show
that defendant was informed and aware of the impending and approaching flood in time to have removed the goods of plaintiff to
higher ground or place of safety, and that tending in like manner,
to show that it omitted, on the night of February 11th, after it was
manifest that there would be an unusual flood and danger therefrom,
to employ the force and means emhployed by other railroads -and
persons, similarly situated at the 'time, to move or switch the cars
containing plaintiff's goods to the 1higher ground a half mile west
of the transfer house, wheire they would have been safe from the
flood, and which there is evidence tending to show could have been
done as late as 11 o'clock that night.
It is not necessary to set out the substance of the testimony in
defendant's behalf to the contrary. Reference will be made to its
general scope in the further progress of this opinion.
In this connection we may say, as is well said by that court,
"We are not concerned with the weight of evidence. If there is
substantial evidence of negligence on the part of defendant, directly
contributing to the injury, it is quite immaterial that there is a
great deal of testimony to the effect that by no diligence could defendant have foreseen or avoided the mischief;" but whilst this is
so, such a state of the evidence makes, we think, the burden of
proof a qhestion of great importance in the case.
The second instruction given at plaintiff's instance is as follows:
2. If the jury believe that the plaintiff's goods were injured while
in the possession of defendant, as a common carrier for transportation, it is incumbent on the defeidant to establs by a fair preponderance of evidence, that the damage or loss was the result immediately and proximately of the "act of God." Proof by plaintiff
of the damage and loss of the goods while in the possession of
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defendant, as aforesaid, makes a prima facie case of negligence or
misconduct on the part of defendant, which must be overcome by
proof that the injury was the result of an inevitable accident, or, in
other words, an act of God, and not its own negligence or misconduct.
If the preponderance of all the evidence does not establish that
the direct, immediate and efficient cause. of the injury was an inevitable flood7 or inundation, the defendant is liable-, and although the
cause ofi the loss may have been an act of Godc, such. as a great flood
in the Maumee river, yet if the defendant unnecessarily exposed
the goods of plaintiff to such peril by any culpable or negligent act
or omission of its own, it is not excused.
The doctrine this instruction announces on this subject, as to the
burden of proof, presents, we think, a serious difficulty in the case,
and its propriety, in view of the evidence, and in. connection with
other instructions given in the cause, is the question we now propose
to discuss briefly.
It is familiar doctrine that the law imposes- upon the common carrier the obligation of safety as to, goods whilst in his possession, and
unless relieved from liability by the act of God, or the public enemy,
he is responsible in damages, although therm maybe no actual negligence on his part.
Whenever the loss occurs from other causes, the law raises-a presumption against him, upon grounds of public policy. If, therefore,
plaintiff shows delivery of his goods to the carrier, and a subsequent
loss- thereof, he need do no more. This is a sufficient statement,
ordinarily, of his cause of action, and a showing to that effect is
sufficient to make out a-prirnafacie case. The onus prolandi is
then on the carrier to bring the case within one- or the other of said
exemptions. 1f, in establishing his said defence, facts and circum-"
stances also appear, tending to show-that his negligence co-operated
to produce the damages, he must, we think, bear the burden of satisfying the jury that they did not directly contribute to the damage,.
and he is not relieved of liability , unless he so shows. In other
words, when the burden is cast on him, he must make a case, in
which no negligence of his own appears, from the evidence. In
that event he is excused prima facie, unless plaintiff then shows,
or it appears from the facts in the case, that his negligence causes
or co-operates to produce the damage complained of. Whether or
not the burden is cast upon the defendant to establish one or the
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other of said exemptions, which,'under the law relieves him, may
depend, we think, upon the state of plaintiff's evidence, or, in~the
language of a text-writer of acknowledged authority, on the nature
of the case the plaintiff makes out: see Whart on Neg., sects. 128129, 661.
Where, as in-the case before us, the act of God appears 'in the
testimony inplaintiff's behalf as a cause of the damage, is the onus
in that event on the defendant, and does the presumption of law
thus declared in the instruction then exist? May the plaintiff,
under this state of facts, ignore such exception, appearing in the
evidence in his behalf, and insist on this legal presumption, whilst
proving, at the same time, the existence in the case of one of the
exemptions, which releases the defendant.
The right of recovery must, in this event, depend, we think, upon
the alternatives presented by the evidence; or, in other words,
upon the facts and circumstances, and inferences- of fact properly
deducible from the evidence, itself. This presumption of law does
not, in this event, co-exist with proof by plaintiff of said exceptions,
which, under the law, excuse the defendant. This state of the case,
which we have been considering upon plaintiff's evidence, was not
changed, we think, at the close of all the evidence, so far, at least,
as the question we are considering is involved. That for defendant
only confirmed the remarkable character of the flood in question,
.and tended to show that defendant could not have foreseen the
danger, or avoided the damage to the goods by the exercise of reasonable and practicable diligence ; whilst that for plaintiff, in rebuttal, was as to this conflicting, except as to the character of the flood
in said river. It may be well to observe in this connection, that
under the ruling of this court in the case of Bllet v. Rd., 76 Mo.
518, this defence is available to the defendant under the general
issue, and need not be especially and affirmatively set up.
But it is said that, upon authority, the rule is otherwise, and that
the contrary has been declared in several cases in this state. We
will examine these cases briefly.
In the case of Wolf v. TIe Express Co., 48 Mo. 428, the wine,
which was the subject of the controversy, arrived at East St. Louis
the 31st of December, and was taken in severe weather, from the
cars and stored and exposed on p platform for a number of da'ys,
and thereby became frozen and damaged. The jury were told that
the burden of proving that the injury complained of was caused by
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the act of God rested7 upon the defendant in- the first. instance, and
then they were further told that ifthe defendant permitted said
wine to lay carelessly, exposed, and it become damaged thereby, they
would find for plaintiff. The instructions were approved, ancl they
are, we think, correct in that sort of a case.
WAGNER, J., speaking for this court, says." "After the damages
to the goods have been established, the burden- lies upon the carrier
to-show that they were occasioned by the act or peril which the law
recognises as constituting an exemption, and then it is still competent for the owner to show that the-injury might have been avoided
by reasonable skill and attention."
Again, in the case of Reed v. Rd., 6W Mo. 206, the same judge
says for the court that "when the loss of the goods is establishe:
the burden of the proof devolves upon the carrier, to show that it
was occasioned by some act which is recognised as an exception.
This shown, it is prima-faciean exonerationand- he is not required
to go further and: prove affirmatively he was guilty of no negligenceThe proof of suchi negligence, if asserted. to exist, rests upon. the
other party :- 1. 206.'

The remaining case cited by plaintiff in this behalf, is that ofPruitv. Rd., 63 'Mo. 529. In, that case two certain lots of hogs,
the subject of the action, were delivered to the carrier for shipment.
There was a very unreasonable delay of a month or more, in shipping the hogs, and: the snow storm and cold weather occurred: in
which the hogs were frozen to death or damaged. The court comments oa the difference between the rulings of the New York courts
and those of Massachusetts, and: other courts upon. the subject of
proximate and remote damages, or damages which the negligence
of the carrier concurs with the "act of Go&" to produce, and the
court say it is well to observe that the latest decisions of this court,
referring to- Wolf v. Express-Co., and Reed v. Rd., incline to theposition of the New York courts, which hold- that *here the negligence of the carrier concurs in, and contributes to the- injury, thedefendant is not exempt-from liability, on the ground that the immediate damage is occasioned by the act of God or inevitable accident,
but there is-no discussion as to the burden of proof in-the case.
In Rd. Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 189, 190, MILLER, J., speaking
for the Supreme Court of the United States, says: "One of the
instances always mentioned by the elementary writers of loss by the
act of God, is the case of loss by flood and storm. Now, when it
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is shown that the damage resulted from this cause immediately he
is excused. What is to make him liable after this ? No question
of his negligence arises, unless it is made by the other party. It
is not necessary for him to prove that the cause was such as released
him, and then prove affirmatively that he did not contribute to it.
If, after he has excused himself, by showing the presence of the
overpowering cause, it is charged that his negligence contributed to
the loss, the proof of this must come from those who assert or rely
on it." Upon the question before us, the case of Reeves v. Rd. is
cited in support of the text in the case of Reed v. Rd., 60 Mo., and
the language of WAGNER, J., in the Reed (lase, and in that of Wolf
v. The Express Co., is almost identical with that employed by Judge
MILLER in Reeves v. Rd.
The Court of Appeals, in its opinion in this case, uses the following language upon this subject: "It is true that when the evidence for plaintiff shows damage, and, at the same time, ' via major'
sufficient in itself to account for the damage, there is no presump.
tion that the negligence of the carier, rather than the vis major,
was theefficient cause of the damage. The general rule laid down
in instruction number two, might, perhaps, by amplification, have
been made more fully and exactly applicable to the case presented
by the evidence. But the whole instruction taken together was not,
we think, misleading."
In'this view we are unable, upon the ground indicated, to concur.
We think it erroneous, under the authorities of this court, which
we have cited, and that it is contradictory and irreconcilable with
the sixth instruction, given at defendant's instance, which is as follows: "The court further instructs the jury, that, if the evidence
shows that the injury to plaintiff's goods was caused by a sudden,
violent and extraordinary flood, at the city of Toledo, whilst the
goods of plaintiff were in the cars, in the transfer house at Toledo,
the verdict of the jury must be for the defendant, unless the plainiiff has shown that defendant was guilty of some specific negligence, with reference to the goods, which actively co-operated with
the act of God to produce the injury." This correct instruction
for defendant was neutralized and lost to it by the misleading and
contradictory instruction number two, suprai given for the plaintiff.
It will be observed that it was7 not only charged in the petition
that defendant negligently permitted the goods of plaintiff- to be
submerged, but it was also charged that defendant negligently per-
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mitted the goods of plaintiff to remain in bulk, wet, after they had
been submerged. If this wvs so, it was a breach of duty, for which
defendant would be liable for any aggravation of damages so occasioned. It was the duty of defendants to preserve the property and
limit the damages, as far as it could, by the exercise of all reasonable and practicable diligence.
The fourth instruction given for plaintiff, submits this question to
the jury, in an instrudtion, which, we think, is unexceptional in
form and phraseology. But we are not satisfied that there was any
sufficient evidence in the case authorizing it. In this behalf the
Court of Appeals says: "There was evidence that the car could
have been opened on February 13th, but I do not find any evidence
tending to show that the goods would have been benefited by opening the car then, or that further damage would have been .thereby
prevented, or how far the goods were injured by not opening the
car, as soon as it was accessible."
If the eiidence was thus deficient in these respects, and from our
examination, we think it is,.the instruction should not have been
given. James H Rich, who was an agent of defendant at Toledo,
but testifying in plaintiff's behalf, says: " The floor of the transfer
house was cov.ered with water for over two days.' We couldn't have
gotten into the transfer house for four days after the flood, then
found the floor covered with mud and water. It would have been
impossible for us to handle the goods on the platform 'without
injuring them." To a like effect is the testimony of Doan Blinn,
testifying for defendant in this behalf.
The evidence shows that defendant put its force at work removing
the ice and other obstructions, and gained access to the transfer
house by the 17th of February, whereas other railroads similarly
situated, did not reach their warehouses for several days thereafter;
and further shows that it then forwarded the goods to St. Louis,
where they arrived .February 23d. The evidence does not show
that this was not as prudent and reasonable course as the defendant
could have adopted under the circumstances, or that the damages
to the goods were increased any by this course of defendant.
The instruction being without evidence sufficient to justify a finding upon this isgue, was, for that reason, we think, improperly
given.
For those reasons, we are of the opinion that the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, as well as that of the Circuit Court, should
voz.. XXXV.-83
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be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, in
conformity herewith, and it is so ordered.
All concur.
The authorities are in conflict upon the
question of the principal case, as to whether when the carrier relies upon the fact
that loss was occasioned by the act of
God, he must go further than the mere
proof of that fact and show that there
was no negligence or want of due care
on his part, but for which the goods
would not have been exposed to danger.
The doctrine of one class of cases is
that when the carrier alleges and relies
upon an exception to his liability by the
ordinary rule of presumption against him
he must bring himself fully within such
exception, not merely by showing that
the goods were lost from a cause for
which, either by the law or by the terms
of his contract, he cannot be held responsible, but by going further and showing
he exercised at least ordinary skill and
care to avoid or escape from the calamity ; and that it must appear that, notwithstanding such care and skill, it was
unavoidable: Hutchinson on Carriers,
sect. 766, p. 593. In other words, it is
held that the burden is on the carrier, not
merely to show that the goods perished,
or were damaged by the excepted accident
or peril, but that he was free from any
negligence contributing to it, and could
not by the use of care and diligence have
prevented it or its consequences, the very
fact of the loss of the goods being prima
facide evidence of negligence, the burden
of rebutting which is cast upon the carricr: Id.
The doctrine of the other class of cases
is that when the carrier has shown that
loss was occasioned by any of the causes,
against liability for the consequences of
which lie is protected by law or by his
contract, it will not be presumed that his,
negligence in any degree contributed to
the loss, but that, on the contrary negliit-If a positive wrong,
gence bh;,"-

the presumption, in the absence of proof
to establish it, will be that the carrier
has done his duty, and that consequently,
Vhen it has been shown that the loss
resulted from any of such causes, under
circumstances which do not show negligence, the burden of proving such negligence, devolves upon the plaintiff. And
this view of the question seems to be
supported by a decided preponderance of
authority in America: Hutchinson on
767, pp. 593-594 ; Lawson
Carriers,
248, pp. 373-5, note 12;
on Carriers,
2 Greenl. Ev. (14 ed.), sect. 218, note
b, p. 206.
That the burden of proving negligence
devolves upon the shipper is also the English doctrine: 1?ichardson v. Sewell, 2
Smith (Q. B.) 205; Czueh v. Gen.
Steam Nay. Co., L. R., 3 C. P. 14; 37
L. J. C. P. 3; 16 W. R. 130; 17 L.
T. (N. S.) 246 ; Ohrloff v. Briscall,
L. R., 1 P. C. 231 ; 12 Jur. (N. S.)
672; 35 L. J. P. C. 63; 15 W. R. 202;
14L. T. (N. S.) 873 ; 4 Moore P. C. C.
(N. S.) 70; Lawson on Carriers, 248.
In cases where the evidence leave the
question of negligence in doubt it was
held, as in Muddle v. Stride, 9 Car.
& P. 380, that the burden of proof is
upon the plaintiff after defendant had
shown that the damage to the goods was
caused by the act of God. In this case
charged the jury that, if on
Lord DEN"
the whole iii their opinion, it was left in
doubt what the cause of the damage was,
then the defendant would be entitled to
the verdict because they must clearly find
the defendant guilty of negligence before
they could find a verdict against him, and
that if it should appear from a full consideration of the case, that the injury might
as well be attributable to the one cause
as to the other, then the defendant would
not be liable for negligence.
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In Wertheimer v. Rd., 17 Blatchf. C.
C. 421, on arrival of the car containing
the goods a mob took possession of it,
and continued to hold it against the military power of the state, and ultimately
fired and destroyed the goods. It was
held that the shipper must prove that the
loss arose from the negligence of the defendant, and that in the absence of such
proof the defendant was not liable for
the value of such goods. WALtcE, J.,
said (p. 422), "The effect of the contract made between the parties was to
impose upon the plaintiff the burden of
proving that the loss of the goods byfire
arose from the negligence'of the defendanut or its agents."
In Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. 272,
Mr. Justice NnLsox says: "That although the injury may have been occasioned by one of the excepted causes in
the bill of lading, yet still the owners of
the vessel are responsible if the injury
might have been avoided by the exercise
of reasonable Ekil and attention on the
part. of the persons employed in the conveyance of the goods. But the onus probandi then becomes shifted upon the
shipper to show the negligence. In Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129,
the judgment. of the court below was
reversed, bec-.use the jury were instructed
that it was incumbent upon .the defendant, the carrier, to bring itself within the
exception, by showing that it had not
been guilty of negligence. Other authorities need not be cited, as the cases
referred to are conclusive upon this court.
The plaintiffs have not shown negligence
on the part of the defendant, and therefore cannot recover."
In Colton v. Rd., 67 Penn. St. 211,
the goodswere destroyed by fire while on
the road. The bill of lading contained
"the dangers incident to railroad transportation, fire and other unavoidable accidents excepted."
The court held that
the onus of proof as to fault was on the
transporter, approving Farnham v. Bd.,
55 Penn. St.-53. See also Lamb v. Cam-

den 8. Amboy Rd. 6- T. Co., 46 N. Y.
271, for an elaborate consideration of this
question, and the dissenting opinion by
PECKHAM, J., on p. 282, et seq. "If

the carrier proves t4at the injury or loss
was occasioned by one of those occurrences which are termed the ' act of God,'
primafade he discharges himself, and
the onus of proving that the alleged cause
or agency would not have produced the
loss or injury without his negligence or
defective means, is thrown upon the
plaintiff:" New Brunswick Nav. Co. v.
Tiers, 24 N. 3. (Zab.) 697.
The following cases hold the same rule:
Wescott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542; Steers
v. The Steamship Co., 57 N. Y..1 ; The
Black Warrior, 1 McAl. 181 ; Wilion v.
S. P. Rd., 13 Rep. (Cal.) 302.
While a majority of the authorities declare the doctrine as above, that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, there
are a large number which lay down the
rule that the onus is upon the carrier to
show that he was not negligent, and that
the loss was due wholly to one of the excepted causes, to relieve himself from liability. The theory in support of this
view is thus stated by the Supreme Court
of Georgia : "What shipper, when he
demands his cotton at the place of delivery, is satisfied to- be told that it was
burnt? He wants to know how it was
burnt; and the carrier is bound to give
the explanation, for he and his servants
alone can do it. He is only excused if
the fire was unavoidable, and he should
prove that it was so. It is, I repeat, in
his power to show the facts, and it §hould
for that reason be made his duty to do so.
Shippers are obliged to trust to carriers.
In the servants and employees of the carrier the shipper will always find reluctant
witnesses.
Why force the owner of
produce to make them his witnesses,
and thus endorse their credibility? In
Tennessee, the employees and servants
of railroads are noi allowed to be
witnesses in behalf of their employers.
Why compel plaintiffs to make them
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their witnesses, and bind them by the
truth of their testimony? The more neg.
ligent they have been in the discharge of
their duty, the more difficult it will be to
extort the truth from them. Could they
be expected to swear that the cargo was
burnt by their negligence ? To place the
onus upon the plaintiff" would be to deny
all redress. I admit the general rule
that he who alleges must prove. 'But it
is equally well established the burden of
proof should be upon him who best knows
what the facts are. If it be said that the
agents and servants may be resorted to
by the shipper as well as the carrier, we
have only to repeat that their wishes,
feelings and interests are all on the side
of their employers. Let the carrier then
prove the loss and the manner of the
loss. Policy aswell as safety of all concerned demand the establishment of such
a rule :" Berry v. Cooper, 28 Ga. 543.
In Baker v. Brinson, 9 Rich. (S. C.)
201, by contract the carrier's liability
was limited. In that case, it is said (p.
203) "That is a sound rule which devolves the onn on him who best knows
what the facts are. In cases of loss,
proof of delivery devolves at once on the
carrier, the oxus of exempting himself
from liability, and nothing can be more
reasonable, before he can take shelter
under an exception, to require proof of
his care."
Many other cases hold the same doctrine: Whitesldes v. Russell, 8 W. & S.
44; United &ales v. Backman, 28 Ohio

St. 144; Mann v. Birchard,40 Vt. 326;
Roberts v. Riley, 15 La. Ann. 103.
Mr. Greenleaf lays down the rule that
in all cases of loss of a common carrier
the burden of proof is on him, to show
that the loss was ocasioned by the act
of God, or by public enemies : 2 Greenl.
on Ev. (14th ed.) j 219. And it has
been laid down that if the acceptance of
the goods was special, the burden of
proof is still on the carrier, to show not
onlythat the cause of loss was within the
terms of the exception, but also that there
was on his part no negligence or want of
due care: 2 Greeul. Ev. (14th ed.)
j 219 ; Swindler v. Hiliard,2 Rich. 286;
Wisteside v. Russell, 8 W. & S. 44;
&oea v.Fairchild 7 Hill (N.Y.) 292.
See the elaborate exposition of .the
meaning of the term "act of God," *respecting the degree of care to be applied
by common carriers in order to entitle
them to its protection by Coczmnx, C.
J., in Nugent v. Smith, L. R., I C. P.
1). 428; 34 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 827;
a. c. 14 Alb. L.3. 164, a decision of the
English Court of Appeals. See, also,
Chicago 6-N. W. By. v. Swyer, 69 Ill.
285; a. c. 18 Am. Rep. 613; McGraw
v. B. 6-0. Rd., 18 W. Va. 361 ; s.c.
41 Am. Rep. 696; Nashville 6- Chattonooga Rd. v. David, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.)
261 ; s.c. 19 Am. Rep. 594 ; 2 Greenl.
on Ev. (14th ed.) 219 and notes.
EuGeNE McQurnaM.
St. Louis, Mo.

SUPremne Judicial Court of Masnachusett.
RIDGEWAY STOVE CO. v. WAY.
An innocent purchaser of certain dwelling-houses, in which furnaces had been
attached to and become a part of the realty, is not affected .byan agreement between
his grantor and the vendor of the furnaces, by the terms of which the latter was to
retain the property in the furnaces untir-they were paid for.
Furnaces placed in the cellar of a house, upon a row of bricks, set in a circle,
with pipes fastened to the ceiling of the cellar, and connecting with the chimney and
registers of the house, are annexed to and become a part of the realty, and will pass
by a deed of the land.
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T is was an action of tort for the conversion of two portable furnaces, with pipes, registers, register borders, and register boxes.
At the trial in the Superior Court, without a jury, before KONGWLTON, J., it appeared that one William Coady was the mortgagor in
possession of certain real estate in. Boston, consisting of two
dwelling-houses, with the land under and adjoining them. Said
Coady, in July 1884, agreed with the agents of the plaintiff that
the plaintiff should place in each of these houses a portable furnace,
with the pipes and registers connected therewith ; that said furnaces, pipes and registers should remain the property of the plaintiff; that said Coady should pay $100 in cash when the furnaces
should be placed in the houses, and thereafter should pay a rental
of $35 a month for said furnaces until the rentals, together with
$100, should amount to $240, when all title to the furnaces in the
plaintiff should cease ; and that this lease of the furnaces should be
put in writing, and signed by Coady. Coady explained to the agents
of the plaintiff that the houses would rent for $30 a month each,
and that, with the money thus received, he would be able to pay for
the furnaces before the interest on his mortgage andi his taxes would
have to be paid. The houses had just been built by Coady, and
were then ready for occupation. In pursuance of this agreement
the agents of the plaintiff took two furnaces from-their stock, and
set them up in the cellars of the houses. The manner of setting
up the furnaces was as follows: Four bricks were set on end on the
floor of the cellar. The base rim of the furnace was placed upon
these bricks. Other bricks were set on end in a circle under the
rim, with the mortar between the bricks,, but no mortar between
the upper surface of the bricks and the rim - and then the other
parts of the furnace were placed upon the rim. The rim, resting
on the circle of bricks, made a joint as tight as was necessary. An
open space was left in the circle of bricks to allow the air from the
cellar (or from out doors, by means of a cold-air box) to pass up
through tle furnace. At the time of the alleged conversion, a coldair box had been connected with one of the furnaces, but the other
had none. There were holes in the top of the casing of the furnace, and collars were placed in these holes. The hot-air pipes
fitted over these collars, resting on the top of the furnace, and were
supported at the further end by wires passing under the pipes, and
fastened to the ceiling of the cellar. The hot-air pipes were slipped
into stationary pipes, which had been placed in the houses by Coady
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when the houses were built, leading from the ceiling of the cellar
upward, through and between the partitions to the rooms of the
house. The smoke-pipe passed into the chimney. Each soap-stone
register border was placed in a hole in the floor, resting on a ledge
of wood. The registers were set in the several -rooms, and each
register and register box rested on the soap-stone border, and connected with the stationary pipes. Neither furnaces, pipes, boxes,
borders, nor registers were in any other manner attached to the
houses or land. There were holes into the chimney from the rooms
of the houses, so that stoves could be used to heat the houses.
On September 8th, in pursuance of his previous agreement, Coady
signed and delivered to the plaintiff a paper, in which he (Coady)
set forth that he had hired and received of the Ridgeway Stove
Company the furnaces, pipes, registers, &c., mentioned above, for
the use of which he promised to pay said stove company, the sum
of $385 a month until the sums paid should amount to $240, when
all rent or claim of the stove company, or its representatives, to said
furniture, should cease; but in case of neglect of said Coady to pay
for said use and rent, before such time as said sums so to be paid
for use and rent should amount to the said sum of 8240, said stove
company and their legal representatives were to have the right to
enter any house or place where the said furniture should be, and
remove the same. November 26th, the defendant received from
Coady a warranty deed of the real estate. There was evidence that
it was given as part of an arrangement by Coady to obtain money
to effect a compromise with his creditors, and there was no evidence
to control the recital of a valuable consideration contained in it.
Nothing was said in the deed about the furnaces. In December
the plaintiff demanded the furnaces of the defendant, who refused
to allow the plaintiff to remove them, and claimed them under his
deed from Coady. The plaintiff never has received any money in
payment for the furnaces, or for the use of them, but it received an
order for $100, drawn by Coady on John S. Lamphrey, and accepted, which it receipted for as a payment of that sum, but which
it has not collected.
The defendant testified that he went into one of the houses, and
through some of the upstairs rooms, before he took his deed, and
saw some of the registers, but that.he never saw the furnaces until
after this action was brought. There was no evidence offered tending to show that he knew of the existence of the furnaces when he
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took his deed, except what appears in these exceptions. There was
no other evidence that he ever made any inquiries about the furnaces from Coady, or any one else. The plaintiff offered the testimony of its agent, Rowe, who made the arrangements with Coady,
and who placed the furnaces in the houses, as to whether or not the
plaintiff, when it placed the furnaces in the houses, intended that
they should become a part of the houses, and also the testimony of
Coady as to whether or not he intended, when the furnaces were
placed in the houses, that they should become a part of the house.
The court excluded this testimony, and ruled that the secret intention of Coady and of the plaintiff, not manifested by their acts or
words, could not be put in evidence to affect the defendant, but
admitted evidence of their acts and agreements.
The court found as a fact that the property claimed in the plaintiff's writ was annexed to and became a part of the realty, and
passed to the defendant by his deed; that Coady built his houses
with a view to their being heated by furnaces similar to these, and
that these furnaces were of a kind ordinarily designed to be kept
and used, as long as they are of any value, to heat the houses in
which they were originally set up; and that both Coady and the
plaintiff intended that the furnaces should become a part of the
realty, but that they both further intended that the furnaces should
not become a part of the realty until they should be paid for; and
ruled that this second intention on their part could have no effect
upon the rights of the defendant. The court declined to rule that
upon all the evidence the defendant was not a bona fide purchaser
for value ; and found as a fact that he was, and that he had no
knowledge or information of any agreement or understanding affecting the rights of an owner of the realty; and also declined to rule
that, if the defendant was a purchaser for value, he was put upon
his inquiry as to whether the furnaces were a part of the realty
or not, and, having neglected to make any inquiries, that he was
affected with notice of what he would have found upon inquiry, towit, that these furnaces were the property of the plaintiff. The
court found for the defendant, and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
Brown & Keyjes, for plaintiff.
-E. 1M. Bigelow, for defendant.
MoiToN, C. J.-It is quite clear that the Superior Court was
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justified in finding that the property claimed on the plaintiff's writ
was annexed to and became a part of the realty, and passed to the
defendant by his deed. The property claimed consisted of two
portable furnaces, with the pipes and registers attached to them.
They were put in as part of the two houses, were essential to the
-enjoyment and use of them as dwelling-houses, and were intended
by the owner to be a part of the realty as soon as they were paid
for. The fact that there wa an agreement between the owner and
the plaintiff that the furnaces should remain the property of the
plaintiff until they were paid for, and that both so intended, is immaterial, unless the defendant had notice of such agreement and
intention. Notwithstanding such an agreement, the property annexed to the realty will pass to an innocent purchaser without
notice: Southbridge Sav. Bank v. Exeter Machine Work8, 127
Mass. 542, and cases cited. As the Superior Court found in the
case at bar that the defendant was a bona fide purchaser of the
houses, without notice of the agreement of the plaintiff, it follows
that his rights are not affected by such agreement, and that the
property in suit passed by his deed of them. The facts that the
defendant did not see the furnaces before he bought, and that he did
not make any inquiries about them, are immaterial. He bought the
houses as they were, and there was nothing to excite his suspicions,
or to put him upon inquiry. The court could not properly rule, as
requested by the plaintiff, that, as the defendant made no inquiries,
"he was affected with notice of what he would have found upon
inquiry, to wit, that these furnaces were the property of the plaintiff."
Exceptions overruled.
Furnaces have, in the past, been quite
a fruitful cause of litigation, and the
earliest reported cases upon the law of
fixtures relate to the right of removing
them. Many of the old cases arose between landlord and tenant, and proceed
upon distinctions as to the method of
attachment which are now untenable.
In the case reported in 20 Henry VII.
13 b., pl. 24, decided in theyear 1504 (21
Hen. VII. 26 b., is probably another report of the same case), itwas held that a
furnace erected by the ancestor, and annexed to the frank-tenement with mortar,
was parcel of the realty, and could not

lawfully be removed by his executors as
against the heir. Doubtless, this furnace was erected for purposes of trade,
but the principle involved remains unchanged to this day.
In 8quier v. Mayer, 2 Freem. Ch. 249;
s. c. 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 430, decided in
1701, it was held, on the other hand,
that a furnace, though fixed to the freehold and purchased with the house,
should go to the executors and not to
the heir. This case, so far as it relates
to the furnace, may be considered as
overruled. See Ewell on Fixtures, p.
214, note.

RIDGEWAY STOVE CO. v. WAY.
The general rule undoubtedly is that
all fixtures, whether actually or constructively annexed to the realty, pass
by a conveyance or mortgage of the
freeholt where there is nothing to indicate a contrary intention ; and furnaces
are not an exception to this rule where
they are intimately connected with the.
house: Main v. Schwarzwaelder, 4 E.
D. Smith 273; Aather v. Fraser, 2
Kay & J. 536; . . 2 Jur. (N. S.)
900.
In Stockwell v. Campbell, 39 Conn.
362, a portable hot-air furnace placed by
the owner of the freehold in a pit prepared for it in the cellar of a house, but
not set in brick or otherwise fastened to
the house or floor, but held in its place
by its own weight, together with the
smoke-pipe leading therefrom to the
chimney, all capable of removal without
injury to themselves or the house, but
intended as a permanent annexation, as
appeared from the pit in the cellar
adapted to its size and depth, were held
to be a part of the realty, rendering the
whole house subject to a mechanic's lien
for the value thereof and the labor of
setting them in the house.
With respect to the main question in the
principal case, there is some conflict of authority. It maybe stated as a general rule
that fixtures placed upon demised premises by a tenant, and which are removable
by him during his term as against his landlord; annexations made upon the land of
another under an agr~eement reserving the
right of removal, and also fixtures sold
by the owner of the land to a third
person but not actually severed, do not
pass by a subsequent conveyance or
mortgage of the land to one having notice of such right: Coleman v. Lewis, 27
Penn. St. 291 ; Davis v. Buffum, 51
Me. 160; 19'ilgus v. Gettingqs, 21 Iowa
177 ; Sowden v. Craig, 26 Id. 156 ;
Morris v. French, 106 Mass. 326 ; Hensley v. Brodie, 16 Ark. 511 : Mitchell v.
Freedley, 10 Penn. St. 198 ; Hunt v.
Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279; HaVOL. XXXIV.-84

yen v. Emery, 33 N. H. 66; Pierce v.
Emery, 32 Id. 484.
In the case of annexations to the lavd
of another by his consent, under an agreement, express or implied, that the property shall remain the personal property
of the person who annexed it, such person being in possession neither of the
land nor the annexation thereto, the
article annexed is as between the immediate parties to such agreement, unquestionably mere personalty. And by the
courts in several states it is held that
such annexation retains its character of
personalty as against third persons purchasing or taking a mortgage upon the
land upon which it stands, bonafide, and
without notice of such agreement; that
it does not pass with the land, and may
be removed by the party annexing it as
against such bona fide purchaser or mortgagee : Russell v. .Richards, 10 Me. 429 ;
s. c. 11 Id. 371 ; Hilborne v. Brown,
12 Id. 162; Tapley v. Smith, 18 Id. 12 ;
Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344; Godardv.
Gould, 14 Barb. 662. See, also, Mattv.
Palmer, 1 N. Y. 564; Hensley v. Brodie, 16 Ark. 511 ; (Cippen v. Morrison,
13 Mich. 34; Sheldon v. Edwards, 35
N.Y. 279 ; Tuft v. Horton, 53 Id. 377.
The rule above stated has, however,
been often disapproved; and, in our
opinion, the better rule, and one more
in accordance with the policy of te recording laws of this country, is to require actual severance or notice of a
binding agreement to sever, in order to
deprive the purchaser or a creditor levying upon the land and fixtures of the
right to the fixtures or appurtenances to
the freehold: Fortman v. Goepper, 14
Ohio St. 565 ; Brennan v. Whitaker, 15
Id. 446 ; Pocers v. Dennison, 30 Vt.
752 ; Davenport v. Shants, 43 Id. 546 ;
Hunt v. Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279 ; Javen

v. Emery, 33 N. H. 66, 69 ; Bringholi"
v. Mlunenrnaier, 20 In. 513: Fryatt v.
Sullivan Co., 5 Hill 116; Trull v. Fuller, 28 Me. 545;
ince v. Case, 10
Conn. 375 ; Landon v. latt, 34 Id. 517.

